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This Article examines the capacity of regional
organizations to coordinate foreign assistance and
development programs in underdeveloped states, and
in doing so, to promote the transformation of the
Right to Development (RTD) - which stresses the right
of nations and their people to progress in a manner
that insures their ability to meet basic material,
security and social needs -from conceptual template
to a binding normative framework under international
law. As the poorest state in the western hemisphere,
but also the recipient of significant influxes offoreign
aid, Haiti exemplifies the underdevelopment dilemma.
For despite the large sums of aid allocated toward
her reconstruction, there is mounting evidence that
the current foreign assistance architecture as
structured cannot ensure either long-term sustainable
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development nor promote the growth of democratic
institutions in Haiti.
Ironically, the reasons behind this failure -
donor/stakeholder bias, donor fatigue and recipient
government incapacity - also explain the failure of
the RTD, at least as it stands thus far, to facilitate the
reconstruction and development of post-earthquake
Haiti. In this sense, Haiti represents an important test
case for states, and international and regional
organizations, an opportunity to articulate precise,
unambiguous doctrinal guidelines under the RTD,
and to back up doctrine with solid, consistent
practice. Because of their geographic proximity to
Haiti and joint membership in the organization, the
OAS member states enjoy a shared interest in the
former's reconstruction especially as it relates to
broader regional security and economic integration
issues, the very hallmarks of the OAS' existence. The
OAS itself possesses the institutional means to
overcome the donor/stakeholder bias and donor
fatigue problems through its ability to coordinate the
actions of its member states in support of the RTD in
Haiti (called "integral development" under the OAS
Charter). What the organization has lacked is the
imagination and institutional will to fulfill this
mandate. Drawing from the growing normative
recognition of the important coordinative role
regional organizations can play in responding to
global crises, this Article sketches a human rights-
based model of foreign assistance coordination
centered on the activities of the Organization of
American States to ensure long-term sustainable
development and democratic consolidation in post-
earthquake Haiti.
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Introduction: Post-Earthquake Haiti and the Persistence of
Underdevelopment
If any one thematic constant has come to define Haiti in the
post-Duvalier era, it is the narrative of underdevelopment. One
commentator has poetically characterized Haiti (officially La
Rdpublique d'Hafti) as the world's "unluckiest country,"' and with
good reason. This impoverished island nation, the poorest in the
Western hemisphere, and one of the poorest on the planet, 2 has
weathered a series of both natural and man-made disasters during her
200-year history. These disasters have rendered sustainable
economic growth and political stability largely unattainable.3 Beset
by a parade of despotic and allegedly murderous political leaders,4
invaded belligerently by hostile powers near and far, often under the
facade of benevolent intervention,5 and pummeled by earthquakes
' Joshua Keating, The Unluckiest Country, FOREIGN POL'Y, Jan. 14, 2010,
available at http://www.foreignpoIicy.com/articles/2010/01/14/the-unluckiest
country.
2 Central America and Caribbean: Haiti, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, U.S.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Mar 16, 2011) https://www.cia.gov/library/publi
cations/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html (follow "economy" hyperlink) (last
visited May 18, 2011).
3 See Erica Caple James, Raptures, Rights, and Repair: The Political
Economy of Trauma in Haiti, 70 Soc. ScI. & MED. 106 (2009) (assessing the
impact of various humanitarian and development interventions in Haiti, and the
subsequent failure of the same to engender long-term stability and sustainable
development there). See also Ian Martin, Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism, 95
FOREIGN POL'Y 72 (1994) (assessing the failure of various multilateral efforts to
engender sustainable development in Haiti and to improve her capacity for
effective self-governance).
4 Some of Haiti's most notorious dictators include Papa "Doc" Duvalier and
his equally despotic son, Baby "Doc." Accused of committing grave human rights
violations, the Duvalier's have also been accused of embezzling hundreds of
millions of dollars from Haiti during their respective dictatorships. In a surprising
turn of events, Baby "Doc" Duvalier recently returned to Haiti after spending over
25 years in exile following a popular revolt, which ousted his government in Haiti
in 1986. Keating, supra note 1, at 1-3.
5 See James, supra note 3, at 107 (describing recent attempts to provide
humanitarian and development assistance to Haiti as a form of "intervention"); see
generally RANDAL ROBINsON, AN UNBROKEN AGONY: HAITI, FROM REVOLUTION
TO THE KIDNAPPING OF A PRESIDENT (2007) (describing in vivid detail the various
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and hurricanes, Haiti has seen her share of conflicts and catastrophes.
But, the devastating January 12, 2010, earthquake definitively
reduced Haiti to true failed state status. 6
Haiti's development woes - or perhaps more appropriately,
underdevelopment woes - run deep. From a largely ineffectual
central government,7 to a deficit of democracy and fractured political
humanitarian, pro-democracy and economically-driven interventions that have
occurred throughout Haiti's history, and the disastrous results that have followed).
6 See Mark Weisbrot, Haiti's Election: a Travesty of Democracy - The
OAS's attempt to Rehabilitate a Fatally Flawed Process Would be Laughable if it
Were Not a Tragic Injustice for Haitians, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 10, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011 /jan/10/haiti-oas-electio
n-runoff; Mark P. Jones, Calamity in Haiti: Consequences of a Failed State,
BAKER INSTITUTE BLOG (Jan. 15, 2010, 8:55 AM), http://blogs.chron.conbakerblo
g/2010/01/calamity-in haiticonsequences of a failed state.html. See also
Organization of American States [OAS] Secretary-General, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., Haiti: Failed Justice or the Rule of Law? Challenges Ahead for Haiti And
the International Community, 6 - 7, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.123, doc. 6 rev. 1 (Oct. 26,
2005), available at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/HAITI%20ENGLISH7X 10%2
OFINAL.pdf, for a scholarly pre-earthquake assessment that reaches the same
conclusion, and analyzing the normative impact of the "failed state" designation
and the "failed state" theory under international law as they pertain to Haitian
reconstruction and law reform efforts implemented by the OAS.
7 See Neil MacFarquhar, Haiti's Woes Are Top Test for Aid Effort, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009, at A5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/
world/americas/3 1haiti.html?adxnnl=1 &adxnnlx=1301410968rAl 1fuSNIXXx/8Y0
1XJ/TQ &pagewanted=print. A number of competing narratives vie for primacy
in explaining Haiti's underdeveloped capacity for effective self-governance. See
id. Many assign blame to poorly coordinated foreign aid programs that waste
millions if not billions of taxpayer dollars on poorly implemented projects that
deliver little if any pragmatic results, other than to transfer wealth to a limited class
of domestic contractors on the U.S. side, and to an entrenched and irredeemably
corrupt Haitian political establishment on the other. See Brett Stephens, To Help
Haiti, End Foreign Aid, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/S
B10001424052748704541004575010860014031260.html. More problematic for
international lawyers, development experts and on-the-ground activists is the
possibility that Haiti's government perennially underperforms not because of
resource limitations, but because political elites within the government- those
actors that control the levers of political and economic power there - actually
benefit from weak central governance and are therefore loathe to alter the behavior
of government organs that interact with foreign donor states, local and
international NGOs, and international and regional organizations. See Christian
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system unable to manage effectively power transitions from
government to government, to an economy that perennially functions
at sub-optimal levels, underdevelopment on the island persists.
Haiti's underdevelopment manifests in other important ways.
Because she boasts no manufacturing sector of significance, the
Haitian people must rely on pricey foreign imports to meet many of
their basic needs.9 As a result, her balance of trade deficit, the
measure of imports to exports, remains high.' 0 This means that
credit-financing from available sources of global capital to support
new industrial or agricultural ventures remains costly and therefore
difficult to obtain.'1
Haiti's agricultural base, historically an important sector of
the economy, has contracted significantly following the 2010
earthquake, and will likely continue to underperform without
massive infusions of aid, including urgent reforestation efforts.12
This contraction follows on the heels of robust expansion during the
2008 to 2009 growing seasons. 13 The development of a modem
economy supported, at least in part, by a functioning agriculture
Whiton, Don't Subsidize Haitian Corruption, Fox NEWS, Jan. 19, 2010,
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/01/19/christian-whiton-haiti-obama-aid-
corruption/print.
8 See Ian Martin, supra note 3. See also Paul Collier, Haiti: From Natural
Catastrophe to Economic Security: Report for the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, FOCAL (Jan. 2009), http://www.focal.ca/pdf/haiticollier.pdf.
9 Nikhil Aziz, Feeding Dependency, Starving Democracy.. .Still,
GRASSROOTS INTERNATIONAL, Mar. 2, 2010, available at http://www.grassrootson
line.org/news/articles/feeding-dependency-starving-democracy-still.
10 See HAITI, THE WORLD BANK (2011), http://data.worldbank.org/country
/haiti (featuring data on Haiti from the World Bank). See also THE WORLD
FACTBOOK, supra note 2.
1 Id.
12 Id.
13 See First Shoots of Haiti's Agricultural Renaissance, FOOD AND
AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 20, 2009)
http://www.fao.org/news/story/0/item/29457/icode/en/; THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
supra note 2 (noting that nearly two-thirds of Haitians depend on some form of
subsistence farming to survive, but also noting that agricultural production remains
imperiled due to massive deforestation and the ongoing the risk of natural disasters
like hurricanes).
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sector demands that Haiti modernize her property, land use and
planning frameworks, if not the entire legal system.14
In human capacity terms, Haiti also underperforms.
Unemployment levels remain amongst the highest of all nations in
the western hemisphere,15 and this situation is exacerbated by high
illiteracy levels. 16 Further undermining reconstruction and
development efforts in the wake of the 2010 earthquake, many of
Haiti's best and brightest have fled the country in search of greater
opportunities abroad, a classic display of the "brain-drain"
phenomenon.17 For those that remain, the lack of basic utilities, the
14 See Modernization of Cadastre and Land Rights Infrastructure in Haiti:
Project Proposal, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 5, 27 (Mar. 2010),
http://www.ifud.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Modemization-of-Cadastre-and-
Land-Rights-Infrastructure-in-Haiti-Project-Proposal-v9-2010.pdf.
15 THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 2 (estimating that nearly two-thirds of
the Haitian labor force remain unemployed or underemployed after the 2010
earthquake).
16 Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Haiti, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, at 11, (May 2006) available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Ha
iti.pdf.
17 See The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Rep., The Least
Developed Countries Report 2007, UNCTAD/LDC/2007 (2007), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/1dc2007_enpdf; see also Dilip Ratha, Helping Haiti
through Migration and Remittances, THE WORLD BANK BLOG (Arp. 20, 2010, 2:09
PM), http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/helping-haiti-through-migration-and-
remittances (explaining that the flip-side to the brain-drain problem is that by
conservative estimates, remittances from Haitian immigrants to friends and
relatives back home amounts to anywhere from 1.5 to 1.8 billion/USD per year; by
some calculations, this means that remittances account for nearly half of Haiti's
national income, a staggering figure. This makes these remittances the most
important source of hard currency in country); Alan Simmons, Dwaine Plaza &
Victor Piche, U.N. Secretary, Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Expert Group
Meeting on International Migration and Development in Latin America and the
Caribbean: The Remittance Sending Practices of Haitians and Jamaicans in
Canada, delivered to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
UN/POP/EGM-MIG/2005/01 (Nov. 14, 2005), http://www.un.org/esa/population
/meetings/IttMigLAC/P0IASimmons (examining the remittance practices of
immigrant communities in Canada, including Haitian immigrants, and noting the
importance this practice plays in promoting the well-being and development of
their countries of origin). It is worth noting that the legal actions undertaken by
developed states to promote greater remittances by expats living in their territories
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ongoing threat of physical violence from organized gangs, and
increasing levels of violence against women, including rape,' 8
further mitigate against long-term sustainable economic, political,
and social development. 9 More recently, the outbreak of cholera
has further undermined human health, welfare, and development
20
efforts. In short, Haiti's reconstruction and development needs
impact virtually every aspect of social, political, and economic life.
Above and beyond the pressing resource demands noted
above, Haiti desperately needs a more responsive foreign assistance
model to ensure long-term sustainable economic development, to
to their countries of origin may very well play an important role in promoting the
full exercise of the RTD. When viewed in this light, administratively simple
actions such as extending to Haitian immigrants living in the United States TPS or
temporary protected status by the Department of Homeland Security and making it
easier for such persons to apply for same, might very well lead to binding practice
if followed by other states out of a sense of legal obligation under the RTD. The
important practical point to note here is that the grant of TPS to qualified persons
(a) poses little political risk to policy makers and government agencies in the eyes
of their domestic constituents, and (b) does not cost very much in monetary or
resource terms. Increasing the number of Haitians entitled to seek TPS and
coupling that freedom from deportation with the right to seek gainful temporary
employment could also create a more favorable environment whereby Haitian
immigrants could send remittances back home. As noted above, the development
benefits in doing so could be significant.
18 See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the U.N.
Stabilization Mission in Haiti, U.N. Doc. S/2010/446 (Sept. 1, 2010) (observing
that rapes, kidnappings, domestic violence, crimes against children and other
outrages remained a major security risk and an impediment to long-term
sustainable development in Haiti).
19 See Athena R. Kolbe & Royce A. Hutson, Human Rights Abuse and other
Criminal Violations in Port-au-Price, Haiti: A Random Survey of Households, in
THE LANCET, Vol. 368, 870-72 (Sept. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.thelancet.com/joumals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(06)69211-8/abstr
act, (noting that widespread criminal and human rights abuses, particularly crimes
against woman and children, have had a profound impact on Haiti's economic
development, necessitating a robust legal and medical response from the
international community).
20 See, Report of the Pan-American Health Organization, Cholera Outbreak,
PAN-AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Jan. 9-15, 2011), http://new.paho.org/
hq/imges/Atlas IHR/-CholeraHispaniola/atlas.html. As of January 19, 2011,
nearly 195,000 Haitians have contracted cholera, and another 3,889 have died from
the disease.
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promote the growth of democratic institutions, and to facilitate
Haiti's capacity for effective self-governance. 2 1 To address these
needs, the international community has erected a plethora of foreign
aid programs to help Haiti reach her reconstruction and development
goals, both pre and post-earthquake.22 From powerful and relatively
wealthy foreign donor states like the United States, to influential
international and regional organizations like the United Nations (UN)
and the Organization of American States (OAS),23 to support from
neighbor states like Venezuela,24 the global response has, at least on
paper, been impressive.25 Nevertheless, the question remains
whether and to what extent the foreign assistance architecture erected
21 See Collier, supra note 8.
22 It is important to note at the outset that the observations expressed in this
Article speak only to those long-term structural assistance programs designed to
improve Haiti's capacity for self-governance and to promote the organic growth of
democratic Haitian institutions, not to the delivery of short-term emergency aid
such as assistance to combat the recent cholera outbreak.
23 John C. Pierce, The Haitian Crisis and the Future of Collective
Enforcement of Democratic Governance, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477, 482-
502 (1996) (offering an assessment of UN and OAS involvement in Haiti during
the Duvalier regime with an emphasis on the economic sanctions imposed against
the dictatorship. The author concludes that regional sanction regimes are
appropriate responses to threats to democracy).
24 See Chavez Writes off Haiti's Oil Debt to Venezuela, HAITI NEWS.NET,
Jan.26, 2010, http://www.haiti-news.net/story/593414.
25 See Rend Prdval, The Decree of The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission,
REPUBLIC OF HAITI, Apr. 21, 2010 available at http://www.cirh.ht/sites/ihrc/en/abo
ut%20us/Pages/default.aspx (follow "Read the Decree of the IHRC") (the
Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was created to coordinate aid efforts
to rebuild Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake. The IHRC Decree states that
"[t]he mandate of the CIRH [IHRC] shall be to conduct strategic planning and
coordination and implement resources from bilateral and multilateral donors, non-
governmental organizations, and the business sector, with all necessary
transparency and accountability. The CIRH [IHCR] shall work to optimize the
investments and contributions of these entities."); see also S.C. Res. 1542, 11, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1542 (Apr. 30, 2004) (authorizing the deployment of an international
stabilization force to Haiti known heretofore simply as "MINUSTAH" after the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), deployed in-country
by the U.N. Security Council, was originally charged with the task of stabilizing
political, social and economic life in Haiti following the political upheavals there
dating back to the 1990s).
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to aid Haiti has promoted, or can continue to promote long-term
sustainable development and democratic governance on the island
nation?
Despite global enthusiasm for increased reconstruction and
development aid in the wake of the devastating January 2010
earthquake, there is growing consensus that the extant foreign
assistance model does not work well.26 Relatively weak supporting
normative frameworks and a weak Haitian government - the legal
and institutional glue required to hold any successful foreign aid
architecture together - plus a lack of project coordination and
execution27 have all undermined prospects for better self-governance
and democratic consolidation in Haiti.28 Indeed, while the foreign
assistance architecture erected to assist Haiti looks impressive on
paper, more often than not, the resultant structures have proven
inherently flawed: impracticable, difficult to maintain, and in many
cases, outright unsustainable. 29
One thing seems indisputable: Haiti needs not just more
26 See Elizabeth Whitman, Haiti: Haphazard Aid Hindering Long-Term
Recovery, GLOBAL ISSUES, Jan. 10, 2011, http://www.globalissues.org/
news/2011/01/10/8130 (citing Emmanuelle Schneider, a spokesperson for the
U.N.'s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Haiti and
noting that organizations like the IHRC that were created to coordinate
reconstruction and recovery efforts in Haiti have failed to do so and also
concluding that these ongoing failures dampen donor enthusiasm for and interest in
Haitian reconstruction and development assistance in the long term); see also Press
Release, Oxfam International, A Year of Indecision Leaves Haiti's Recovery at a
Standstill (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/
pressrelease/2011-01-06/year-indecision-leaves-haiti-recovery-standstill.
27 Whitman, supra note 26.
28 See Press Release, Oxfam International, supra note 26 (noting that at the
outset, these observations address only those long-term structural assistance
programs designed to improve Haiti's capacity for self-governance and to promote
the organic growth of democratic Haitian institutions, not to the delivery of short-
term emergency aid such as assistance to combat the recent cholera outbreak).
29 See generally Jean Max Bellerive, Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment
ofDamage, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs, ANNEX TO THE ACTION PLAN FOR
NATIONAL RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HAITI (Mar. 2010) (stressing the
need for aid in various economic and human welfare sectors and the need to better
coordinate aid delivery frameworks).
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development, but more effective development. 30 What is lacking and
what continues to impede progress in the reconstruction and
development of Haiti is a clearer, more coherent articulation of the
institutional and normative means to that elusive end, backed by
correspondingly deep and consistent state practice and
implementation. 3  The most widely accepted explanations why the
traditional foreign assistance architecture in Haiti has failed to
promote long-term sustainable economic, social and political
development, namely a lack of foreign donor coordination, 32 donor
fatigue,33 and a weak Haitian central government unable to fulfill its
obligations, are widely known. What these narratives fail to address
is the transformative role that clearly articulated normative
frameworks coupled with reconfigured institutional arrangements
can play in shaping pragmatic solutions to Haiti's development
challenges. This article attempts to address this shortcoming.
The most obvious doctrinal candidate for this task, the Right
to Development (RTD), recognizes the right of nations and their
30 See generally Academy International Affairs Working Paper Series, Why
Foreign Aid to Haiti Failed: Summary Report of the National Academy of Public
Administration, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 15 (Feb. 2006).
The authors note that foreign assistance programs in Haiti have failed over the past
two decades because of (1) poor project coordination and (2) a weak Haitian
central government unable to utilize or effectively deploy foreign aid resources.
These implementation problems lead to "donor fatigue," that is, donor frustration
with events and actors on the ground. Donors then move to fulfill reconstruction
and development obligations originally undertaken by the Haitian government and
its attendant administrative organs, resulting in weary donors and missed
opportunities for Haitian agencies and Haitian workers to learn valuable skill sets,
which would increase their capacity for self-governance.
31 Id. See also Stephen P. Marks, A Legal Perspective on the Evolving
Criteria of the HLFT on the Right to Development, in IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT
To DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 11, 14-15, (Stephen P.
Marks ed., Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2008) (advocating a treaty-based solution to
the challenge of transforming the RTD from a soft law concept to a binding
normative framework under international law. Dr. Marks' work was prepared to
assist the U.N. High Level Task Force in ascertaining the most productive avenue
toward implementing the RTD as a "legal standard of binding nature").




people to enjoy unfettered participation in democratic structures of
governance, the full measure of fundamental human rights and
freedoms, and access to basic material essentials such as food and
shelter. 3 First, enshrined in the Declaration on the Right to
Development,35 is an entitlement framed categorically as a basic
human right, recognizing the central importance that effective social,
economic, political, and cultural enhancement plays in securing
human wellbeing (and the wellbeing of underdeveloped states as
well).36 And yet, for all of its broad conceptual appeal, including the
powerful hold the RTD has on the legal imaginations of development
experts and human rights advocates far and wide, the right remains
doctrinally underdeveloped. 37 More telling, states, as well as regional
and international organizations, that have promised vital assistance to
post-earthquake Haiti and her people, rarely, if ever, frame the
34 See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex,
41 UN. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 186, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 9, 1986)
[hereinafter Declaration].
3 Id. The Declaration provides in pertinent part:
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations relating to the achievement of international co-operation in
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or
humanitarian nature, and in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion, ... Concerned at the existence of serious
obstacles to development, as well as to the complete fulfillment of
human beings and of peoples, constituted, inter alia, by the denial of
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and considering that
all human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and
interdependent and that, in order to promote development, equal
attention and urgent consideration should be given to the
implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights and that, accordingly, the promotion of, respect
for and enjoyment of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms
cannot justify the denial of other human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Id.
36 Id.
37 Nicolaas Schrijver, Many Roads Lead to Rome: How to Arrive at a
Legally Binding Instrument on the Right to Development, in IMPLEMENTING THE
RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (Stephen P.
Marks ed., 2008).
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obligations they undertake as actual binding commitments
undertaken pursuant to the RTD. 38
This article sketches a dynamic theory of regional
organizational foreign assistance coordination and facilitation
centered on the activities of the OAS to better ensure long-term
sustainable development and democratic consolidation in post-
earthquake Haiti. This includes a more focused enumeration of the
specific norms and obligations of states via both treaty-based,
domestic policy, and legislative frameworks in order to ensure that
underdeveloped states, like Haiti, and their peoples enjoy the full
exercise of the RTD. Under the OAS Charter, development
aspirations are subsumed under the regional concept of "integral
development," a model that stresses the importance of development
as part of wider goal to integrate the economies of the OAS Member
States.39
Part I of this article traces the origins of the RTD, outlines its
essential doctrinal parameters, and identifies the primary region
where the right itself remains underdeveloped: the realm of state
practice. In Part II, this article examines the basic institutional and
doctrinal underpinnings that would permit the OAS and its member
states to promote the progressive enhancement of the RTD through
coordinated action. This involves a detailed examination of the
Charter of the OAS to ascertain precisely what the organization and
its member states are capable of doing, ever mindful of the material
and financial limitations of the organization.
38 See Report of the Private Sector Economic Forum, Vision and Roadmap
for Haiti, FORUM ECONOMIQUE Du SECTEUR PRIVE, 5 (Mar. 23. 2010) (report
prepared for the government of Haiti by the ICHR, yet not once does the document
mention that the vast sums of aid pledged to assist in Haitian reconstruction and
development efforts is forthcoming as a matter of right. The document speaks in
terms of "spirit of cooperation" and asserts that all reconstruction and aid
frameworks erected to assist Haiti must be guided by a sense of accountability,
promote wide-sector economic growth, show a commitment to modernization, be
Haitian-led, and undertaken with an aim toward rendering Haiti aid-independent.
Yet no mention of key rights and obligations appears anywhere in the document).
39 Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, Chap. VII, art. 30 [hereinafter OAS Charter].
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Part III summarizes the insightful observations of political
scientists Felix Kirchmeier, Monika Like, and Britt Kalla in
connection with the Kenya-Germany Development Partnership.
Kirchmeier and associates advocate a human rights-based approach
(HRBA) to promoting the RTD in underdeveloped a states.40 This
article recasts the HRBA as a hybrid model, one that stresses the
implementation of basic human rights, transitional justice, and
regional economic integration initiatives as core structural pillars of
the RTD that should be erected with robust Haitian participation
under the organizational aegis of the OAS. 4 1 This approach has the
capacity to clarify in a concrete normative context the specific rights
recognized by, and obligations undertaken by both donor and
beneficiary states under the RTD, an approach that could greatly
benefit Haitian reconstruction and development efforts. While the
OAS has made modest headway in this regard, much more needs to
be done.
L The Right to Development: A Conceptual and Normative Overview
As noted above, the RTD recognizes the right of nations and
their people to enjoy unfettered participation in democratic structures
of governance, the full measure of fundamental human rights and
freedoms, and access to basic material essentials such as food and
shelter.42 Enshrined in the Declaration on the Right to Development
(hereinafter: the Declaration), the RTD, an entitlement framed
categorically as a basic human right, recognizes the central
importance that effective social, economic, political, and cultural
development plays in securing human well-being.43
Although no specifically enumerated definition of
"development" appears in the Declaration, nor has the international
40 See Felix Kirchmeier et al., Towards the Implementation of the Right to
Development: Field-testing and Fine-tuning the U.N. Criteria on the Right to
Development in the Kenyan-German Partnership, FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG
(2008).
41 Id.
42 See Declaration, supra note 35.
43 Id. art 1.
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community agreed on a universally accepted understanding, the
emphasis the Declaration itself places on three core bundles of rights
does suggest the broad contours of the RTD.44  First, and perhaps
foremost, the Declaration attaches primacy to basic human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including freedom from all forms of
discrimination, gender and racial bias, religious oppression, and
other forms of bias.45 Second, the RTD, as framed in the Declaration,
stresses the importance of respecting fundamental civil and political
rights and fundamental freedoms, self-determination, and the right of
people to live freely from colonial domination, and other forms of
external domination. 4 6 Finally, the Declaration stresses the centrality
of reasonable access to the material indicia of human well-being,
including reasonable access to food, safe drinking water, and
shelter.47 Together, these three sets of entitlements - respect for basic
human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic governance and
self-determination, and the material necessities of life, encapsulates
in the broadest terms what is meant by the RTD, at least as framed
under the Declaration.48
44 Id. art. 1, 2, 5, 8.
45 Id. art. 5.
46 Id. art. 5-6.
47 Id. art. 8. Suggesting only that states "should undertake" measures needed
to secure these rights for the most underdeveloped states and their peoples. The
Declaration leaves to subsequent progressive development and state practice
consistent with same to give binding effect to the aspirational template laid out in
the document. It is in this context that the supportive actions of regional
organizations like the OAS and their member states can play a central role in
shaping enhancement of the aspirational frameworks articulated in the Declaration.
See generally Paul Martin, Regional Efforts at Preventive Measures: Four Case
Studies on the Development of Conflict-Prevention Capabilities, 30 N.Y.U. J.INT'L
L. & POL. 881 (1998).
48 Beyond the broadly articulated conception of "development" contained in
the Declaration, the idea itself has exerted a powerful hold on the imaginations of
scholars, historians and activists, especially when examining how global economic
and trade policies have promoted development in some quarters, while hindering it
in others. See generally WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED
AFRICA (1973), available at http://www.blackherbals.com/walter-rodney.pdf
(examining how Europe's comparative advantage in exploration and shipping
enabled the colony powers to accelerate their economic and institutional
development at the expense of African development).
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And yet, for all of its broad conceptual appeal, including the
powerful hold, the RTD has on the legal imaginations of
development experts and human rights advocates far and wide, the
right remains doctrinally underdeveloped.49  Part of this
underdevelopment stems from ambiguities within the Declaration
itself. On the one hand, the Declaration identifies both
underdeveloped states, and their citizens as the core beneficiaries of
the various RTD entitlements.50  In a similar vein, the Declaration
charges beneficiary states and their citizens on the one hand, and
more developed states and international and regional organizations
on the other, both individually and collectively with the obligation to
ensure the full exercise of the RTD via its progressive development
under international law.
Under a normative architecture that some feel verges on
incoherence, 52 beneficiaries become obligees and vice-versa, making
it difficult to determine precisely who should do what, and how.53 In
practical terms, what is presently lacking then is the necessary
legislative and treaty-based policy focus to clarify what actions states
(and international and regional organizations) must take in order to
ensure the full exercise and progressive development, or
enhancement of the RTD,54 and the institutional will to see this
49 Schrijver, supra note 37, at 126.
50 Margot E. Salomon, Part I: The Right to Development as a Legal Norm:
Chapter 1: Legal Cosmopolitanism and the Normative Contribution of the Right to
Development, in IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (Stephen P. Marks ed., 2008).
5' Id.
52 Marks, supra note 31, at 11, 14-15.
Dante M. Negro, Chapter 7: Article 17 and Chapter VII of the Revised
OAS Charter and Relevant Experience of OAS Institutions, in STEPHEN P. MARKS
(ED.), IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 64, 66-68 (2008), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/05659.pdf.
Dante M. Negro is Director of the Office of International Law of the Organization
of American States, Washington, D.C.
54 Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), at 4 Art.
15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/174(ll) (Nov. 21, 1947). Article 15 of the Statute of the
International Law Commission defines "progressive development" as the
"preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by
international law, or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently
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process through.
Importantly, and by its own admission, the Declaration
recognizes that the RTD has yet to attain the status of a binding
normative framework under international law. 56 Accordingly, it falls
to states and international and regional organizations, actors that in
theory possess the necessary material resources and institutional
capacity; to ensure the full exercise of and "progressive
enhancement" of the right via effective policy and legislative
formulation and subsequent implementation. 57 To the layperson, the
"progressive enhancement" of the RTD, that is, the transformation
from doctrinal concept to binding norm must occur through the
formulation of clear, transparent rules and consistent state practice
pursuant to those rules, such activities facilitated by the coordinating
support of international and regional organizations.58
In a state like Haiti, one whose development needs run the
gamut, from governmental incapacity to political fragmentation, to a
broken physical infrastructure and a chronically underperforming
economy, the progressive enhancement of the RTD (or "integral
development") will require a high degree of coordination of state
action, as well as, international and regional organizational
coordination. 59
developed in the practice of States." Id. It defines "codification" as "meaning the
more precise formulation and systemization of rules of international law in fields
where there already has been extensive state practice, precedent, and doctrines."
Id.
5s See generally Marks, supra note 31, at 11, 14-15.
56 Declaration, supra note 34, at 3-4. Under Article 3, "[S]tates have the
primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions
favorable to the realization of the right to development;" and Article 4 "[S]tates
have the duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international
development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to
development." Id.
5 Id. at Arts. 4-5.
58 Id.; see also Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between
Rhetoric and Reality, 17 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 137 (2004) (noting the lack of global,
regional, and state coordination in support of the RTD).
5 See Declaration, supra note 34; see also Marks, supra note 58; see
generally Press Release, Press Department, Organization of American States
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When viewed in this light, state action and the coordinating
activities of international and regional organizations must address:
(1) what specific bundle of rights the RTD's beneficiaries enjoy, and
(2) the precise institutional obligations that the subjects of
international law operate under pursuant to the RTD's broad
conceptual frameworks. 60 Vis-A-vis Haiti, foreign donor assistance
efforts must emphasize the responsibility of states as well as regional
and international organizations61 to provide the necessary legislative
and treaty-based guidance to ensure the full exercise and progressive
enhancement of the RTD. Haiti therefore represents an important
test case for ascertaining both the boundaries of the RTD, and the
specific obligations that it imposes on the relevant subjects of
international law charged with its progressive enhancement and full
exercise.
Yet, if history - both near and distant - provide any clues,
then it is not at all clear that key donor states such as the United
States or potentially France, possess the necessary political will to do
[OAS], Chief of OAS-CARICOM Observation Mission to Present Update on
Upcoming Haiti Elections, OAS Press Release (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.oas.org
/en/media center/press release.asp?sCodigo=AVI-265/10 (brief press advisory of
the Joint OAS-CARICOM Observation Mission to Haiti). In late October 2010,
the author had the privilege to attend an extraordinary meeting convened by the
Joint OAS-CARICOM Observation Mission to Haiti at OAS headquarters in
Washington, D.C. to apprise members of the press, the academy, and development
experts as to the progress of OAS-supported reconstruction and development
efforts in Haiti. While hardly dispositive of institutional thinking, the session was
noteworthy for the failure of any party in attendance, especially the OAS
representatives, to talk in terms of Haiti's right to development assistance. This is
particularly significant, indeed ironic, given the central role assigned to the concept
of "integral development" as defined in Chapter VII of the OAS Charter. OAS
Charter, supra note 39. The session was also noteworthy in that it was apparent, at
least to the author, that a wide gulf separated what the Haitian activists in
attendance wanted from the OAS-CARICOM Observation Mission (and OAS
more generally) and what the Mission was actually doing. The author's anecdotal
observations seem to bear out the scholarly observations of Professor Marks
surrounding the failure of regional organizations to coordinate the actions of their
member states in fulfillment of the RTD, or even to recognize the doctrine's
relevance to the activities.
60 See Marks, supra note 58.
61 See id.
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what is needed to ensure the erection of a more effective
reconstruction and development architecture in Haiti under the RTD.
For its part, U.S. involvement in Haiti has been defined by consistent
racial bias and essentialism.62 In comparative terms, the U.S. has
engaged in discriminatory treatment of Haitian refugees seeking
political asylum versus comparable favorable treatment for Cuban
refugees. 63 According to one commentator, U.S. involvement in
Haiti has also involved outright breaches of international law with
respect to the CIA supported activities therein.64 On the domestic
front, political inaction and donor inconsistency has led to the failure
65
of Congress to deliver promised aid to the Haitian people.
To be charitable, France, the former colonial power that
exercised sovereign control over Haiti prior to the latter's declaration
of independence in 1803, has behaved toward her former Haitian
slaves in a manner more befitting a petty principality than a mature
democracy. 66 Following an international conference convened in
October 2003 to assess the validity of claims that France should pay
reparations to Haiti, then-French foreign minister, Dominique de
Villepin sent an envoy to Haiti requesting that her democratically-
elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, step down from power.67
62 See generally Jordan E. Dollar, Involvement in the 2004 Removal of
President Aristide, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 642 (2008) (explaining that the U.S.
involvement in Haiti from 1804 until 2004 has been motivated by racist
"essentialism").
63 See Juan Montes, Haitian Interdiction on the High Seas: A US. Policy of
Bias and Inconsistency, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 557 558-59, 572 (1993) (providing
a useful comparison of U.S. immigration practices toward Haitians and Cubans,
and highlighting those specific policy preferences that favor Cuban refugees over
their Haitian counterparts).
6 See Kathleen Marie Whitney, Sin, Fraph, and the CIA: U.S. Covert Action
in Haiti, 3 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 303, 304 (1996) (Synopsis of CIA activities in
Haiti that violated international laws).
65 See generally Mary Beth Sheridan, U.S.-Sponsored Conference Pledged
Billions to Rebuild Haiti, but Little Paid Out, WASH. PosT, July 19, 2010,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2 010/07/18/
AR 2010071801838.html.
66 See ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 59.
6 Id. Haiti's claim against France for reparations is based on (1) French
exploitation of Haitian slave labor prior to Haitian independence in 1803, and (2)
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France also denied President Aristide's wife the right to attend a
global AIDS conference in France, and snubbed Haiti's president on
the eve of the island nation's 200th anniversary. 68
The author should point out that this discussion is not an
attempt to paint the relationship between Haiti and France in purely
black and white terms. Indeed, France, like many other wealthy
states, pledged promptly and generously to aid Haiti in the wake of
the January 2010 earthquake. 69 The point to take away from this
discussion is simply that France, much like the United States, despite
the sometimes generous promises of assistance each has made
toward Haitian reconstruction and development, cannot be expected
to follow through with their promises, and certainly not in a way that
promotes the progressive enhancement of the RTD as regards Haiti
because they remain fundamentally biased actors, both institutionally
and historically. 70
On the European side of the equation, foreign policy efforts
in the 1990s to extend preferable trade terms to banana exporting
states in the Caribbean (including Haiti), Sub-Saharan Africa, and
the Pacific, efforts that actually began in the 1970s, 7 1 resulted in a
bitter multi-year trade dispute.72 The dispute pitted European states
the crushing reparations imposed on Haiti as the price for France recognizing the
new black state after the successful rebellion against French rule.
68 Id. It is worth comparing and contrasting France's response to the 200th
anniversary marking Haiti and the Haitian people's freedom from enslavement and
foreign tyranny.
69 See Press Release, Foreign and European Affairs Ministry Spokesman,
Statement of the Embassy of France in Washington, Summary of French Humani-
tarian Aid for Haiti, Jan. 15, 2010, http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?articlel493.
70 See Declaration, supra note 35, art. 5.
71 African, Caribbean and Pacific States - European Economic Community:
Final Act, Minutes and Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomd, Dec. 15, 1989, 29
I.L.M 783 (1990) [hereinafter Convention of Lom6]. The EEC implemented the
so-called banana protocol to provide the ACP States broader, but also easier,
access to European banana markets by improving local marketing and production
conditions for the exporting states. The specific portion of the "banana protocol"
that led to prolonged litigation was Council Regulation (EEC) 404/93 of 13
February 1993 on the Organization of the Market in Bananas. Council Regulation
404/93, 1993, O.J. (L 047) (EEC), (1993).
72 Convention of Lom6, supra note 72. The EU complainants argued that
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against one another, and forced Latin American exporting states to
side against their Caribbean, Africa, and Pacific counterparts on
economic grounds. 7 3 The history of the so-called "bananas war"
highlights the normative challenges that the international community
faces in promoting the economic and social development of
underdeveloped states via targeted trade preferences, which fail to
consider their broader pragmatic impact on other developing states.74
In other words, while one can credibly argue that the trade
preferences provided for under the Lom6 Convention were erected to
facilitate the economic development of former European colonies in
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific,75 these efforts largely failed
because the donor states (the European supporters of the trade
preferences) 76 failed to coordinate their actions with regional players,
and in other parts of the world, namely, in Latin America and the
United States.77 Effective development frameworks require not just
the Lomd-ACP provisions violated the rules and objectives of the Treaty of Rome
on economic integration, violated basic property rights and the concept of
nondiscrimination in international economic relations, and violated the concept of
nondiscrimination enshrined in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) frameworks. See Case C-280/93,
Federal Republic of Germany [F.R.G.] v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5039, 34 I.L.M.
154 (1995).
7 Id.
74 See Michelle Williams, Comment: Caribbean Shiprider Agreements: Sunk
by Banana Trade War? 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 163 (2000).
7 Id. at 167.
6 Id. at 167-68. The banana protocol's strongest European supporters
included France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. It is worth noting that while
France strongly supported the protocol as both a developmental assistance and a
"reparational" trade structure, her historic behavior toward Haiti, one of the ACP
beneficiary states, has proven inconsistent at best, and highly biased at worst.
n Williams, supra, note 74. The United States, several Latin American
banana exporting states, and those European states that did not support the banana
protocol challenged its legality before the World Trade organization and ultimately
prevailed. See First Submission of the United States, European Communities -
Regime for the Implementation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 1996 WL
397092 (July 9, 1996); U.S. interests were implicated in this dispute because U.S.-
based banana producers, corporations, originally complained to the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) that the banana protocol effectively operated as an
unfair subside that rendered ACP-produced bananas cheaper that their Latin
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sound normative glue to succeed. They require thoughtful global
coordination and implementation as well.
But, at the regional level, there may yet be cause for cautious
optimism. Because of their geographic proximity to Haiti, and joint
membership in the OAS, the organization's member states enjoy a
shared interest in the former's reconstruction, especially as it relates
to broader regional security and economic integration considerations,
the hallmarks of the OAS' existence.78 The OAS itself potentially
possesses the institutional means to overcome the kinds of
donor/stakeholder bias, and donor fatigue problems noted above
through its ability to coordinate the actions of its member states in
support of the RTD in Haiti.79 What the organization has lacked is
the imagination and institutional will to fulfill this mandate based on
a sanguine assessment of its unique, but also limited institutional
capacities, at least in material and monetary terms.so Drawing from
the growing normative recognition of the important institutional and
coordinative role regional organizations can play in responding to
global crises,81 this article sketches below a dynamic theory of
American-produced counterparts. See generally Trade Act of 1974 §§ 301-09,
amended by 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-15 (1996); see also Case C-280/93, F.R.G. v.
Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5039, 34 I.L.M. 154 (1995); see also Jeffery M. Brown,
Black Internationalism: Embracing an Economic Paradigm, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L.
807 (2002).
78 OAS Charter, supra note 39, at § VII, Art. 30. The Charter provides in
pertinent part: "The Member States, inspired by the principles of inter-American
solidarity and cooperation, pledge themselves to a united effort to ensure
international social justice in their relations and integral development for their
peoples, as conditions essential to peace and security. Integral development
encompasses the economic, social, educational, cultural, scientific, and
technological fields through which the goals that each country sets for
accomplishing it should be achieved." Id.
7 Id. at § VII, Art. 30.
80 See Marks, supra note 58.
8' See Jeremy Levitt, The Peace and Security Council of the African Union,
13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 113 (2003); see also Paul Martin,
supra note 46, at 932-37 (detailing how regional organizations - especially the
OAS and OAU- and the efficiency of their activities regarding preventive
measures in their respective regions have promoted regional peace and stability.
Martin also discusses instances of cooperation between the UN and regional
organizations, and concludes that decisions in favor of this type of cooperation
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regional organization foreign assistance facilitation, centered on the
activities of the OAS, to ensure long-term sustainable development,
and democratic consolidation in post-earthquake Haiti.
II. The Right to Development and the OAS: Exploring the Doctrinal
Scope of the RTD under the OAS Charter
Ascertaining the degree to which the OAS recognizes the
RTD, as a binding normative construct, under the organization's
Charter is not as straightforward a task as one would hope. Any
discussion of the RTD and the depth of its acceptance as binding
under the Charter of the OAS must begin with a brief analysis of the
organization itself, followed by a discussion of Chapters IV and VII
of the OAS Charter.
The OAS is the oldest organization of its type in the world,
predating even the European Union, a sly irony given that all of the
OAS' Member States were themselves former colonies of the major
European powers.82 In some quarters, the OAS enjoys a reputation
as perhaps the best-organized, and most effective of all the regional
organizations of its type. 83  The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, along with the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, has produced an enviable body of human rights jurisprudence
that has resulted in the widespread human rights normative
should continue to be made on an ad hoc basis); see generally Pierce, supra note
23, at 496-98 (assessing UN and OAS involvement in Haiti during the Duvalier
regime with emphasis on the economic sanctions that were imposed and
concluding that regional sanction regimes are appropriate responses to threats to
democracy); but see Benjamin Manchak, Comprehensive Economic Sanctions, the
Right to Development, and Constitutionally Impermissible Violations of
International Law, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 417, 430-35 (2010) (arguing that
sanctions against undemocratic but also underdeveloped states like Cuba may
violate the RTD).
82 See Christoph G. Benedict, Organization of American States, in 3 MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 810, 810-811 (Rudolf
Bernhardt, ed.,1997). The Charter of the OAS was signed in Bogota, Columbia in
1948, incur- porating into the corpus of the new organization the remnants of the
International Union of American Republics (1890) and the Pan-American Union
(1910).
83 See Paul Martin, supra note 47, at 904, 905.
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compliance throughout the region. 84
In the very broadest terms, Chapter IV outlines the
fundamental duties undertaken, and the rights enjoyed by all
sovereign states.85  Article 10 of the Charter recognizes one to
another that "states are juridically equal, enjoy equal rights and equal
capacity to exercise those rights, and have equal duties." 86 Article
11 imposes on all OAS member states the fundamental duty to
respect the political and territorial sovereignty and rights of every
other state "in accordance with international law."87
The Charter further ensures the inviolability of these
mandates, stating unequivocally that "these fundamental rights may
not be impaired in any manner whatsoever."88  Stated more
succinctly, the Charter affirms the traditional notion of state equality
and sovereignty, and recognizes the inviolability of these rights in all
instances.89 As part of this overarching bundle of rights and
protections, the Charter also recognizes as inviolable, the right of
each state to develop culturally, socially, politically, and
economically in a free and natural manner. 90 Concomitant with the
recognition of the state's right to self-development (or development),
the Charter imposes on each state the obligation to recognize and to
protect individual human rights.9 1 Echoing this set of human rights
constraints, the Charter prohibits its members from interfering with
the right of any other state to develop its cultural, political, social,
and economic life and attendant institutions. 92
84 See Santiago Canton, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:
50 Years of Advances and the New Challenges, AMERICAS QUARTERLY, (2009),
http://www.americasquarterly.org/Inter-American-Commission-Human-Rights
(last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
85 See generally OAS Charter , supra note 39, at § IV (outlining the
fundamental duties and rights of states); Id. at intro-note (Heidi v. Jimenez).
86 OAS Charter, supra note 39, at § IV, Art. 10.
81 Id. at § IV, art. 11.
88 Id. at § IV, art. 12.
89 Id. at § II, art. 3(b).
90 Id. at § IV, art. 17.
' Id. at § IV, art. 30.
92 Id. at § IV, art. 19-21.
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Unfortunately, while the OAS does recognize the right of
Member States to pursue their individual development agendas free
from undue interference by other states - and ideally with the
support of the latter - the Charter does not actually articulate the
precise meaning of the term "development." 93 Chapter VII of the
Charter does, however, articulate a very broad conceptual framework
whereby the Member States are urged to facilitate, both individually
and collectively, efforts to ensure social justice, and "integral
development" for their peoples. 94 Not unlike the Declaration on the
Right to Development, Article 30 of the OAS Charter views
"international social justice" in foreign relations and "integral
development" as necessary preconditions to global and regional
peace and security. 95
While arguably no more precise in formulation than the
definition of "development" provided in the Declaration, the OAS
Charter's definition of "integral development" and surrounding
conceptual structure, are telling. The Charter provides: "Integral
development encompasses the economic, social, educational cultural,
scientific, and technological fields through which the goals that each
country sets for accomplishing it [integral development] should be
achieved." 96 Additionally, the content and structure of Chapter VII
strongly suggests that each state's development goals should ideally
be seen, and acted upon, as part of an integrated strategy to promote
regional peace and security in the political, human rights, and health
and welfare arenas.97
When viewed in this light, each state's development goals
should best be understood as part of larger regional effort to
eliminate poverty,98 promote peace and security, democratic
governance, social justice, wage equity, and broader Member State
economic, trade, political, and security integration. Indeed, these
93 See generally id. at § V1l.
94 Id. at § VII.
" Id. at § VI Art. 30.
96 id
9 Id. at § VII.
98 Id.
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aims are the very hallmarks of the OAS' existence. 99 In this sense,
the OAS Charter does not recognize expressly the RTD as a distinct
human right, but rather promotes the "integral development" of the
Member States and their peoples as a conceptual means to a
particular organizational end, namely, the integration of all Member
States around a set of shared values: social justice, democratic
governance, respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms,
greater economic integration, and the adoption at both the state and
regional levels of vital security frameworks to better ensure regional
peace and stability. 00
When understood in these terms, it becomes a bit clearer, if
not abundantly so, that the duty which each Member State owes to its
(1) citizens both individually and collectively, and (2) to the other
Member States, is the obligation to cooperate institutionally to fulfill
the broad goals articulated in the Charter and under Chapter VII in
particular.' 0' Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to suggest that the
provisions contained in Chapter VII represent the essence or soul of
the document, and that the concept of "integral development" along
the axes spelled out therein represents the conceptual architecture
upon which the entire OAS superstructure rests.102
Added organizational and normative clarity in connection
with Haitian reconstruction and development efforts under the OAS
umbrella unfortunately represents a double-edged sword. For while
Chapter VII broadly identifies the kinds of frameworks around which
Member State action should coalesce, those provisions do not
identify with sufficient clarity what values enjoy primacy under the
Chapter VII architecture, nor where the process of "integral
development" 0 3 should begin with a state like Haiti. That task falls
9 See id. at § I Art. 2.
100 See id. at § VII Art. 30.
101 See generally id. at § Vll.
102 See generally id. Although conceptually distinct, these bundles of rights
or entitlements are treated as doctrinally related under the existing international
human rights normative frameworks.
103 See generally id. at § VII. Moreover, Article 33 states that
"[d]evelopment is a primary responsibility of each country and should constitute
an integral and continuous process (emphasis added) for the establishment of a
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to Part III of this Article.
III. The OAS and the Progressive Enhancement of the RTD (and
"Integral Development') via a Hybridized Approach Human
Rights-Based Approach
As noted above in Part II, the Declaration emphasizes three core
bundles of rights (at a minimum). First and foremost, the Declaration
attaches primacy to basic human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including freedom from all forms of discrimination, gender and
racial bias, religious oppression, and other forms of bias.104 Second,
the RTD as framed in the Declaration, stresses the importance of
democratic governance, self-determination, and the right of peoples
to live freely from colonial domination and other forms of external
domination.s05 Third, the Declaration stresses the centrality of
reasonable access to the material indicia of human well-being,
including reasonable access to food, safe drinking water, and
shelter. 106 Together these three sets of entitlements, what one might
collectively refer to as the pillars of development - respect for basic
human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic governance and
self-determination, and the material necessities of life - encapsulate
in the broadest terms what is meant by the RTD.
It is worth noting that in broad conceptual strokes, the
emphasis that the Declaration attaches to the three core pillars of
development described above, closely mirror those areas that enjoy
prominence under the OAS Charter's "integral development"
framework, including the Charter's appeal to its Member States to
take the steps necessary, individually and collectively, to formulate
and implement regional and international development policies with
a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to
development. 107
more just economic and social order that will make possible and contribute to the
fulfillment of the individual." Id. at § VII, Art. 33.
104 See Declaration, supra note 34, art. 5-6.
10 See id. art. 5.
106 See id. art. 8.
107 OAS Charter, supra note 39, at § VII Art. 30-32.
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This suggests that in order to facilitate effectively the right of
"integral development," the OAS ideally should urge the Member
States to restructure their foreign assistance initiatives toward Haiti
in line with this type of normative coordination. 08 This involves the
creation and implementation of (1) domestic policy and legislative
initiatives in that direction, 109 and also (2) bi-lateral and multilateral
agreements between the Member States, individually and
collectively, and Haiti to facilitate the latter's full realization of the
right to development globally and the right to "integral development"
regionally. 110 It is of course axiomatic to suggest that such
legislative and treaty-based efforts must explicitly reference the
RTD, and/or the right to "integral development" as the doctrinal
foundation upon which the particular framework in question rests.'H]
The value of facilitating the full realization of the RTD (and
the right to "integral development") by assigning implementation
primacy to human rights frameworks has begun to receive wider
recognition from scholars, development experts, and even states
themselves. 11 2  Indeed, some commentators advocate the
implementation of a human rights-based approach (HRBA) to the
broader development question as the best way to ensure the
progressive enhancement of the RTD. 113 In pragmatic terms, initial
developmental emphasis on creating structures to ensure compliance
with existing human rights frameworks also addresses some of the
most pernicious on-the-ground impediments to effective Haitian
reconstruction and development, such as gender-based violence and
crimes against children.114
108 id
109 One such example is the United States-sponsored Trade and
Development Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. § 3701 (2001) or AGOA, a domestic free
trade bill designed to promote stronger trade ties between the recipient states in
Sub-Saharan Africa and the U.S.
10 See Kirchmeier et al, supra note 40, at 29-30.
1 Marks, supra note 31, at 67.
112 See generally Kirchmeier et al, supra, note 40.
113 id.
114 See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 18 (read accompanying text
also).
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While the author generally approves of a HRBA to facilitate
the full exercise of the RTD and the right to integral development, it
is crucial to remember that Haiti's pre and post-earthquake foreign
assistance needs encompass virtually all spheres of endeavor,
meaning that it requires aid in the human rights, democratic
entitlement, and economic integrations spheres with equal urgency.
This article recasts the HRBA as a hybrid approach, one that places
the implementation of basic human rights, transitional justice, and
regional economic integration initiatives on equal footing under the
RTD. Furthermore, the right to integral development involves the
robust participation of the Haitian people as part of the development
process. This approach has the capacity to clarify in a concrete
normative context the specific rights recognized by, and obligations
undertaken by both donor and beneficiary states under the RTD, an
approach that could greatly benefit Haitian reconstruction and
development efforts.
Under this specific reconstruction and development model, I
explore two ways by which the OAS and its Member States can
fulfill their obligations under the RTD in Haiti. In addition to the
primary areas where the OAS presently operates in Haiti,
(interestingly in collaboration with another regional organization, the
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)," 5
namely coordinating efforts to ensure free and fair elections, and
reforming property laws and property registration frameworks, this
article identifies (1) the creation of transitional justice mechanisms to
address gross human rights violations, and (2) the deeper integration
of Haiti into regional and global trade and investment structures as
core objectives that the OAS must promote under the RTD.
A. Human Rights and Transitional Justice
Addressing adequately the full range of human rights
.1. In 2001, the OAS and its Caribbean counterpart, the Caribbean
Community and Common Market or CARICOM created a Joint Mission to better
integrate regional reconstruction and development efforts in Haiti. See Press
Release, Joint OAS/CARICOM Initiative on Haiti (May 9, 2001), available at
http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press2002/en/press2001/May01/050901.htm.
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challenges confronting post-earthquake Haiti lies well beyond the
institutional capacities of the OAS and its Member States. The
prevalence of rapes, kidnappings, crimes against children, and other
outrages unfortunately requires a robust police presence, something
organizations like the United Nations seem better equipped to
provide given the shortcomings of Haiti's so-called caretaker
government. However, efforts to promote broader human rights
compliance, and ultimately, adequate modes of transitional justice
via the courts are areas where the OAS and its Member States boast
both considerable expertise, and where solid legal precedent exists
both domestically and regionally.
At the regional level, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
represent institutional success stories that compare favorably to
similar efforts undertaken anywhere else in the world, including the
European Union.116 The depth of the Court's jurisprudence is
impressive, and the regional level of compliance it dictates is
notable.117 The international community mobilized considerable
resources to Rwanda following the country's brief, but bloody civil
war, to train novice lawyers and judges and to create mobile circuit
courts to try indicted war criminals.18 The essentially non-
functioning Haitian judiciary sorely needs this type of expertise to
assist in its redevelopment.
At the domestic level, many of the OAS Member States boast
useful expertise in the implementation of post-conflict transitional
justice mechanisms,1 9 having seen firsthand the destructive impact
116 Marks, supra note 31, at 64. Acknowledging that the OAS remains
perhaps the most successful regional organization of its type in the world.
117 Tara J. Melish, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in SOCIAL
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 372, 73-74 (M. Langford, ed., 2008).
118 Development Programs In Rwanda, USAID.Gov, http://www.usaid.gov/
press/factsheets/2004/fs040405.html, (last visited Mar. 30, 2011); Gregory P.
Joseph, Terrorism and U.S. Law, 29 NAT'L L.J. 14 (2006).
"9 Truth Commissions, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL.COM, http://www.amnes
ty.org/en/international-justice/issues/truth-commissions (last visited on May 18,
2011).
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that internal armed conflict has had on developing nations. These
states could provide invaluable assistance to Haiti under either a bi-
lateral or multilateral judicial reform assistance framework that
targets the creation of special human rights courts in Haiti to
prosecute responsible parties. 12 Again, the emphasis here is on
matching specific recipient state needs with the unique capabilities of
the donating Member States, and the coordinating regional
organization, here, the OAS.
B. Haiti, the OAS, and Regional and Global Economic Integration
Potentially useful models of trade-based economic
development and integration do exist. One such model is the
preferential trade regime erected by the European Union in the
1990s, to assist small banana exporting states in the Caribbean,
Africa, and the Pacific.121 In concept, the so-called "banana
protocol" represented precisely the kind of trade-based development
initiative that many underdeveloped agricultural export-dependent
states require. 122 The banana protocol framework failed to deliver its
intended benefits, not because of conceptual flaws, but because of
implementation shortcomings.123
Specifically, the failure of the European states that supported
the initiative to coordinate their efforts with the development goals
of other states, particularly banana producers in Latin America, and
with states hosting corporate actors that relied on Latin American
bananas as part of their core business model, placed the latter two
stakeholder classes (the Latin American producers and the United
120 The author offers no personal opinion as to whether Baby "Doc"
Duvalier, recently returned to Haiti from years in exile, should be prosecuted in a
Haitian criminal court or should face prosecution before a special human rights
tribunal. The author does note that the use of such transitional justice mechanisms
can do much to legitimize transitional governments and government elites in the
eyes ofjaded constituents.
121 See generally Convention of Lome, supra note 71.
122 See Council Regulation 404/93 supra note 71 (The specific portion of the
"banana protocol" that led to prolonged litigation was Council Regulation (EEC)
404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the Organization of the Market in Bananas.).
123 See Brown, supra, note 77.
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States) in direct competition with the former class of stakeholders
(the ACP states). 124 This was a failure of normative coordination,
one rendered all the more troublesome, given that organizations like
the European Union (EU) possess the specific institutional capacities
to overcome these problems by providing a forum for interested
parties to agree on a common course of action before conflicts
arise. 125
The Bananas War therefore serves as a cautionary tale to
trade and development experts who advocate the use of targeted
trade preferences to promote economic growth, stabilization, and
development in underdeveloped states. The lesson is that such
initiatives have the potential to reap substantial economic benefits to
the recipient states, but the donor states must ensure effective
coordination of the specific trade framework with both the recipient
states, and other developing economies that might suffer competitive
economic harm as a result.
The author is not unmindful of, nor insensitive to the waves
of criticism directed against the United States claiming that its
behavior in the Bananas war reeked of neo-colonialism.12 But, the
broader normative issue here involves the capacity of regional
organizations, like the OAS, to assist its Member States in
overcoming these kinds of trade-based hostilities. This can be done
via the institution of broad trade negotiating forums so that their
collective efforts might lead to further facilitate the full exercise of
the RTD, and the right to integral development.
124 See First Written Submission of the United States, European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas,
1996 WL 397092 (G.A.T.T.) (July 9, 1996). Tensions arose when U.S.-based
banana producers realized that the banana protocol had the effect of marginally but
significantly increasing the cost of their bananas over and above the cost to smaller
producers in the ACP states who paradoxically did not enjoy corporate economies
of scale. The USTR challenged this arrangement as a violation of fundamental fair
trade principles. See Trade Act of 1974 §§ 301-09, amended by 19 U.S.C. §§
2411-2415 (1988). See also Case C-280/93, F.R.G. v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-
04973, 34 I. L. M. 154 (1995).
125 See Vahe Heboyan, et al., U.S.-E.U. Banana War: Implications of
Retaliatory Tariffs on Pecorino Cheese, AGECON FS 00-18 (Nov. 2000).
126 Williams, supra note 74, at 185.
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Conclusion
The RTD represents a potentially invaluable normative tool
for mobilizing state action in support of efforts to facilitate the
development goals of the least developed, most beleaguered states in
the world, states like Haiti. There is little question that wealthy
donor states, like the United States, and regional organizations, like
the European Union, have the resource capacity to assist in this
process. Yet, their efforts are routinely undermined by internal
historical biases toward states like Haiti, and by Haitian institutional
shortcomings as well. Regional organizations, like the OAS, on the
other hand, can potentially bridge this institutional divide by
providing the type of normative support and coordinative expertise
needed to overcome the bias challenges and institutional
inefficiencies that plague larger donors.
What is needed then is a more concerted effort to facilitate
the progressive enhancement of the RTD, and the right to integral
development via robust regional organizational coordination
activities in the human rights and economic integration spheres. This
article has modestly proposed a few discreet ways to facilitate this
task. Haiti seems like the perfect place to begin.
